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IDENTITY AND EXPLANATION
IN THE EUTHYPHRO
DAVID EBREY
. Introduction
I many of Plato’s Socratic dialogues Socrates emphasizes the im-
portance of knowing the answer to a ‘what is it?’ question. What,
exactly, is he looking for when he asks these questions? The Eu-
thyphro is widely acknowledged as important for determining this,
but scholars have not agreed on what insight the dialogue offers.
Richard Sharvy, in a classic paper, presents an appealing and influ-
ential account, and more recently Lindsay Judson has defended the
same sort of account. According to their accounts, Socrates thinks
that an answer to ‘what is the holy?’ should identify somemore fun-
damental feature of holy things that is prior to their being holy and
explains why they are holy. (I use the word ‘feature’ for what is
© David Ebrey 
I have received valuable feedback on this paper from Hugh Benson, David Bron-
stein, Victor Caston, Andy Engen, Matt Evans, Emily Fletcher, Joe Karbowski,
Sean Kelsey, Richard Kraut, Alison Mastny, Kirsten Pickering, John Wynne, the
two anonymous referees, and the audiences at the  NEH Summer Seminar
on Socrates at Lewis and Clark College, King’s College London, the Chicago
Area Consortium in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, and the University of
Arkansas.
 I do notmean the phrase ‘Socratic dialogue’ to indicate any particular view about
chronology. For this use see J. Cooper (ed.),Plato: CompleteWorks [CompleteWorks]
(Indianapolis, ), pp. xii–xviii. For the main claims of this paper, it is not neces-
sary that these dialogues form a coherent group.
 R. Sharvy, ‘Euthyphro  – : Analysis and Definition in Plato and Others’
[‘Analysis’], Nous,  (), –; L. Judson, ‘Carried Away in the Euthyphro’
[‘Carried’], in D. Charles (ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy (Oxford, ), –
. T. Irwin, ‘Socrates and Euthyphro: The Argument and its Revival’, in L. Jud-
son and V. Karasmanis (eds.), Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays (Oxford,
), – at , cites Sharvy with approval. For an overview of the literature
before  see D. Wolfsdorf, ‘Euthyphro   –  : A Study in Platonic Meta-
physics and its Reception since ’ [‘Study’], Apeiron,  (), – at –.
In the secondary literature the topic is typically put in terms of definition. I avoid
using the term ‘definition’ because it typically picks out a linguistic entity, which is
not what Socrates is interested in, and because it typically brings with it assumptions
that I want to question.
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indicated by adjectives such as ‘holy’ and ‘god-loved’.) On this in-
terpretation, in proposing that the god-loved is what the holy is,
Euthyphro is committed to holy things being holy because they are
god-loved. The ‘because’ here does not indicate our evidence that
something is holy, but rather a more fundamental (metaphysical,
if you like) feature of the world that explains why holy things are
holy. On this account, answers to ‘what is it?’ questions are valu-
able precisely because they reveal more fundamental features, fea-
tures that are objectively prior and explanatory. Saying that these
are objectively prior and explanatorymeans that their status as prior
and explanatory does not depend on someone’s epistemic situation.
If this is the correct way to understand the Euthyphro, we find here
for the first time an extremely important way to think of ‘what is it?’
questions, one that would seem to have influenced Aristotle, who in
turn influenced a wide variety of philosophers from Aquinas to Kit
Fine.According to Aristotle, an answer to the ‘what is it?’ question
should identify something that explains why, for example, some-
thing is a human. On this account, if we were to provide ‘rational
 I do not call these ‘predicates’ because predicates are typically thought of as
linguistic entities. Note the difference between nouns such as ‘the holy’ and ‘holi-
ness’ and adjectives such as ‘holy’ and ‘god-loved’. When formalized, ‘holy’ and
‘god-loved’ are picked out by ‘f ’ and ‘g’ rather than ‘f-ness’ and ‘g-ness’. Here is an
example of why it is important to have a term that picks out f rather than f-ness.
Socrates is committed to claims such as ‘the holy thing is holy because of holiness’.
It is important to distinguish the explanandum, the thing’s being holy, from the ex-
planans, holiness. That said, the connection between an answer to ‘what is f-ness?’
and its associated feature can sometimes be cumbersome. Thus, I shall sometimes
say, for example, ‘on the Aristotelian interpretation an answer to “what is holiness?”
should pick out some more fundamental feature, g’ as a shorthand for ‘on the Aris-
totelian interpretation an answer to the “what is holiness?” question should pick out
something, g-ness, where g is a more fundamental feature . . .’. On a separate note,
I am following all previous interpreters in thinking that this use of ‘the holy’ picks
out the same thing as holiness.
 I discuss these objective explanatory relations further in the next two sections.
 e.g. K. Fine, ‘Essence and Modality’, Philosophical Perspectives,  (), –.
 Sharvy, ‘Analysis’,  ff., explicitly compares his account to Aristotle’s. There
are, of course, controversies about Aristotle’s account, but what I say here is fairly
uncontroversial. For Aristotle’s account of definitions as explanatory see especially
Post. An. . , . , and . . For example, he says, ‘So, as we say, to know what
something is is the same as to know why it is’ (a–, trans. Barnes). The basic ac-
count I provide here is found, for example, in W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Prior and Pos-
terior Analytics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford, ),
–; J. Barnes, Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, nd edn. (Oxford, ), –; D.
Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (Oxford, ), –; and D. Bron-
stein, Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics (Oxford, ).
Of course, certain features of Aristotle’s account are not found in the Euthyphro ac-
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animal’ as an answer to ‘what is a human?’ we would be saying that
someone is a human because he or she is a rational animal. I will call
this the ‘Aristotelian interpretation’ of theEuthyphro. I do notmean
to suggest that it is an anachronistic reading of Aristotle back into
Plato; if it is right, the Euthyphro is the likely source of Aristotle’s
own account.
While it would be powerful if it were correct, in this paper I argue
that Socrates does not have this Aristotelian account of ‘what is it?’
questions in the Euthyphro. Indeed, his account in the Euthyphro
is incompatible with such an approach to ‘what is it?’ questions.
According to the alternative I defend, an answer to a ‘what is it?’
question does not pick out an explanatorily prior feature; instead,
it picks out the very same feature, which a fortiori is in all the same
explanatory relations. So, in claiming that the god-loved is what the
holy is, Euthyphro is not committing himself to every holy thing be-
ing holy because it is god-loved. That would make god-loved prior
to holy. Instead, he is committing himself to ‘god-loved’ and ‘holy’
being interchangeable within objective explanations since they are
the very same thing. I call this account the ‘strict identity inter-
pretation’. While the Aristotelian interpretation provides an ap-
pealing model of how to answer the ‘what is it?’ question, there is
also something appealing about thinking that an answer to ‘what
is f-ness?’ should identify precisely f-ness, not something different
from it.
While the Aristotelian interpretation and the strict identity in-
terpretation each present powerful ways of thinking about the an-
swer to a ‘what is it?’ question, they cannot both be correct. Con-
sider how each would interpret the proposal that proportion is what
beauty is. According to the Aristotelian interpretation, if this were
correct, something would be beautiful because it is proportionate.
Of course, a proportionate thing is not proportionate because it is
proportionate—an explanation should be different from what it is
explaining. Thus, on this account, we cannot simply move between
claims about something’s being beautiful and its being proportio-
nate. Put generally and more formally:
cording to any interpreters. For example, Aristotle thinks that a definition picks out
the middle term in a certain sort of demonstration. Moreover, for Aristotle defini-
tions are explanatory in an additional way: they are the basis for further features of
the substance, those picked out by the second sense of καθ ᾿ αὑτά in Post. An. . 
(a–b). There is nothing like this in Plato’s account in the Euthyphro.
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Aristotelian interpretation
If g-ness is what f-ness is, then:
Every f thing is f because it is g.
According to the strict identity interpretation, by contrast, if pro-
portion is what beauty is, then anything explained by being pro-
portionate is explained by being beautiful, and vice versa. Being
beautiful and proportionate would be the very same thing, and so
involved in very same relations. Put generally:
Strict identity interpretation
If g-ness is what f-ness is, then:
f and g are exactly the same and hence interchangeable within
explanations.
According to this way of thinking, if proportion is what beauty is,
being proportionate could not be prior to being beautiful. On the
strict identity account, Socrates’ search for knowledge leads him to
look for something that is not prior to being holy, but rather the
same as it. While Socrates early in the dialogue suggests that an an-
swer to ‘what is the holy?’ should have some sort of priority ( 
– ), I argue that he is not requiring the sort of priority that the
Aristotelian interpretation suggests. Instead, he is saying that holi-
ness is prior to the individual holy things.
Wolfsdorf and Evans have noted textual evidence that strongly
suggest an identity interpretation, and Evans has defended such an
interpretation at length, as one step in a different project. My pa-
per builds on their work by addressing more of the evidence that
seems to favour the Aristotelian reading and by more fully develop-
ing an account of the explanatory work done by answers to the ‘what
is it?’ question. Moreover, while our accounts are similar, Wolfs-
dorf and Evans each accept claims that bring their views closer to
 According to this interpretation, ‘f ’ and ‘g’ are not only intersubstitutable in the
because clause, but also in the clause that it explains. Putmore formally (for arbitrary
x and y):
If x is y because it is g, then x is y because it is f .
If x is y because it is f , then x is y because it is g.
If x is g because it is y, then x is f because it is y.
If x is f because it is y, then x is g because it is y.
 The text is cited from Platonis opera, vol. i, ed. E. A. Duke et al. (Oxford, ).
I discuss this and related passages below, in sect. .
 Wolfsdorf, ‘Study’, , andM. Evans, ‘Lessons from Euthyphro  – ’ [‘Les-
sons’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), – at  and –.
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the Aristotelian interpretation. I maintain a stricter sort of iden-
tity interpretation here. My account begins with Socrates’ famous
argument against Euthyphro’s proposal that the holy is the god-
loved. I start by showing how this argument is naturally read in
line with the strict identity interpretation (Section ). Then I ar-
gue that the strict identity interpretation can avoid the concern that
Socrates’ argument illicitly substitutes terms (Section ). Next, I
spell out the problems with understanding the argument in line
with the Aristotelian interpretation (Section ). After this evalu-
ation of the two interpretations, I show how the strict identity in-
terpretation can address three textual considerations that seem to
favour the Aristotelian interpretation (Section ): (i) Socrates’ fa-
mous opening question in his refutation of Euthyphro’s proposal;
(ii) his distinction between ousia (being) and pathos (affection); and
(iii) his early descriptions of what he wants from an answer to ‘what
is the holy?’. Having fleshed out the strict identity interpretation,
I contrast it with other identity interpretations and explore some
questions that arises for it (Section ). Finally, I show how the strict
identity interpretation can provide informative answers to ‘what
is f-ness?’ questions, despite not identifying anything other than
f-ness (Section ).
. The central argument
The first step is to consider Socrates’ argument against Euthyphro’s
proposal that the holy is the god-loved (  –  ). We are look-
ing for an account that clarifies both the role of explanatory relations
in the argument and the constraints the argument places on a cor-
rect answer to a ‘what is f-ness?’ question. Socrates argues that if
Euthyphro’s proposal were correct, he would be committed to two
contradictions. His argument does not rely on an infinite regress,
circularity, or a reductio ad absurdum, as is sometimes claimed.He
 For Wolfsdorf, ‘Study’, this is connected to his account of ousia (being), which
I discuss in sect. . For Evans, ‘Lessons’, this comes out in his defence of his ‘foun-
dation’ requirement, which I discuss in sect. . In contrast to their views, on my ac-
count if we ask ‘what is it?’ about something that is metaphysically or explanatorily
posterior, then our answer should pick out something metaphysically or explana-
torily posterior.
 While people frequently make these claims in conversation or teaching, I have
seen such a claim in print only in P. Dimas, ‘Euthyphro’s Thesis Revisited’ [‘Revi-
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reaches these contradictions from two pairs of claims. One pair is
about why the gods love holy things. The other is about why things
are god-loved. Let us being with these two initial pairs of claims:
Why holy things are loved by the gods
() The holy is loved [by the gods] because it is holy. (  ,
  –)
() It is not the case that the holy is holy because it is loved. ( 
–,   )
Why god-loved things are god-loved
() The god-loved (θεοφιλές) is god-loved because it is loved [by
the gods] (φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν). (  –,   –)
() It is not the case that the god-loved is loved because it is god-
loved. (  –)
Socrates draws two contradictions from these claims by transform-
ing () into (a) and () into (a):
(a) The god-loved is loved because it is god-loved. (  )
() It is not the case that the god-loved is loved because it is
god-loved. (  –)
(a) The holy is holy because it is loved. (  )
() It is not the case that the holy is holy because it is loved.
(  –,   )
Each pair of contradictory claims affirms and denies that some ex-
planatory relation holds. One of the main interpretative questions
is why Socrates thinks he can transform () to (a) and () to (a).
While there are questions about how to understand () and (),
which I discuss in the next section, in general they are much easier
to understand than () and (). At this stage we need a basic ac-
sited’], Phronesis,  (), – at . He claims that the argument is a reductio ad
absurdum.
 In these claims ‘the holy’ and ‘the god-loved’ seem to refer to arbitrary god-
loved or holy things, not the forms. Thus, () is naturally read as a statement about
why god-loved things are loved, not about the form of being god-loved. This is
widely accepted in the literature (e.g. Evans, ‘Lessons’,  n. ; Wolfsdorf, ‘Study’,
–). Wolfsdorf, ‘Study’, , notes earlier scholars who explicitly accept this.
 For a broadly similar reconstruction of the argument, but one that implicitly
assumes the asymmetric correlates () and () rather than making them explicit, see
A. Kim, ‘A Chiastic Contradiction at Euthyphro   –  ’, Phronesis,  (),
–.
Created on 17 May 2017 at 11.15 hours page 82
Identity and Explanation in the Euthyphro 
count of () and () in order to see how Socrates’ argument works.
Socrates uses the term ‘god-loved’ (θεοφιλές) interchangeably with
‘being-loved-by-the-gods’ (φιλούμενον ὑπὸ θεῶν, e.g.   –), so
() can be put as the following: something being-loved-by-the-gods
(τὸ φιλούμενον ὑπὸ θεῶν) is being-loved-by-the-gods (φιλούμενον ὑπὸ
θεῶν) because it is loved by the gods (φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν). In order to
understand this claim, it is crucial to distinguish ‘is being-loved-by-
the-gods’ (ἐστι φιλούμενον ὑπὸ θεῶν), the verb ‘to be’ with a passive
participle, from ‘is loved by the gods’ (φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν), a finite
passive verb. Socrates argues for () from    to  , thereby
making clear that is loved by the gods (φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν) is sup-
posed to be different from being-loved-by-the-gods (φιλούμενον ὑπὸ
θεῶν). This distinction is hard to capture in English, since both ex-
pressions (ἐστι φιλούμενον ὑπὸ θεῶν and φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν) can be
translated ‘is loved by the gods’. Both involve passive forms of the
verb ‘to love’ (φιλεῖν). Intuitively, we can think of the distinction
this way: being-loved-by-the-gods, the passive participle, picks out
an affection, the same affection as is picked out by the term ‘god-
loved’. This is an affection possessed by certain things. By contrast,
the finite verb ‘is loved by the gods’ describes a relationship that
something can have to the gods; it applies to something in so far
as that thing is the recipient of the gods’ action. (), then, says that
something has the affection of being god-loved because it is loved by
the gods—the fact that something is the recipient of the god’s action
explains its having this affection; () says that it does not work the
other way round: something’s having the affection does not explain
its being the recipient of the action.
Note that these two pairs of claims—()/() and ()/()—
exemplify a principle of asymmetry that Socrates consistently
assumes throughout the Euthyphro: if something is A because it is
B, then it is not the case that it is B because it is A. For example,
as Evans notes, at   – Socrates infers from one claim to its
 P. T. Geach, ‘Plato’s Euthyphro: An Analysis and Commentary’ [‘Commen-
tary’],TheMonist,  (), – at , despairs of making sense of the distinc-
tion.Most other scholars offer some suggestion similar to my own, e.g. S.M. Cohen,
‘Socrates on the Definition of Piety: Euthyphro  – ’ [‘Definition’], Journal of
the History of Philosophy,  (), – at –. However, Evans, ‘Lessons’, –,
thinks it should be understood in terms of the distinction between active and pas-
sive, instead of between two things that are passive: the patient of the action, in so
far as it is a patient, and the resulting affection. This is a subtle distinction, and one
that someone could deny, but it is certainly not incoherent.
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asymmetric pair. Given () and asymmetry, () is true, and given
() and asymmetry, () is true. Thus, given asymmetry, we can
treat () and () as a single commitment and similarly treat () and
() as a single commitment. Socrates does not provide us with an
account of what he means by his use of the term ‘because’. Asym-
metry gives us some clue as to how Socrates is thinking of these
explanatory relations. If you have two pieces of wood propped up
against one another, youmight say that each is standing up ‘because
the other is standing up’. But given that Socrates infers from one
claim to its asymmetric pair, clearly he is not using ‘because’ to
pick out such relations (just as Aristotle denies the possibility of
circular explanation in Posterior Analytics . ). Instead, Socrates
would supposedly say something like this: each piece of wood is
standing up because there is an opposing force preventing it from
falling. Note that asymmetry applies here: it is not the case that
there is an opposing force because it is standing up. Asymmetry
makes sense if you think of ‘because’ as indicating the underlying
explanation of why something is the case: if A is the underlying
explanation for B, then B cannot be the underlying explanation for
A. I discuss these explanatory relations further in the next section.
Socrates presents his argument by first asking questions from
   to    that lead Euthyphro to agree to ()–() and then de-
claring at   – that Euthyphro’s proposal cannot be correct.
Euthyphro does not understand why, so Socrates succinctly collects
claims ()–() from    to  . He says that they have agreed to
them, even though they had not explicitly agreed to (), only its
asymmetric pair (). He then explains why Euthyphro’s proposal
cannot be correct using something that appears to substitute ‘god-
loved’ for ‘holy’ and vice versa, transforming () to (a) and () to
(a) from    to    (quoted below). Given these transforma-
tions, there is an incompatibility between Euthyphro’s views about
why gods love holy things, () and (), and the relation between be-
ing god-loved and loved-by-the-gods, () and (). Consider one of
the contradictions. Euthyphro thinks that () holy things are loved
by the gods because they are holy, but he thinks that () it is not the
case that things are loved by the gods because they are god-loved.
But when we transform () to (a), we learn that things are loved
by the gods because they are god-loved, which is exactly what ()
denies.
 Evans, ‘Lessons’, .
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The question, then, is what allows us to transform () to (a) and
() to (a). These transformations appear to involve substituting
‘god-loved’ for ‘holy’ in () to produce (a) and ‘holy’ for ‘god-
loved’ in () to produce (a). The simplest account—and the one
I think is correct—is that Socrates is directly substituting one term
for the other, because he thinks that according to Euthyphro’s pro-
posal ‘holy’ and ‘god-loved’ pick out the very same thing. This is
the strict identity view. There are a number of complexities that
need to be considered before we can appreciate my full case for this
reading. But before considering these, we should consider the most
direct evidence for this view, which is how Socrates describes the
transition from () to (a) and () to (a):
ἀλλ ᾿ εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, εἰ [] μὲν διὰ
τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο τὸ ὅσιον, [a] καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν τὸ
θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ [] διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἦν, [a] καὶ
τὸ ὅσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὅσιον ἦν. (  –  )
But if the god-loved and the holy were the same, my dear Euthyphro, then
if [] the holy was loved because it was holy, [a] the god-loved would also
be loved because it was god-loved; and if [] the god-loved was god-loved
because it was loved by the gods, then [a] the holy would also be holy
because it was loved by the gods.
In explaining the transformation of () to (a) and () to (a) Soc-
rates starts by saying ‘If they were the same . . .’. As others have
noted, Socrates seems to think that in saying that the holy is the
god-loved, Euthyphro is saying that they are the same. Accord-
ing to the Aristotelian interpretation, they are not strictly speak-
ing the same; instead, on this view there is an important difference
between the holy and the god-loved—the one is prior to the other.
Both Sharvy and Judson claim that Socrates is simply misspeaking
when he suggests that if Euthyphro were right, then the god-loved
and the holy would be the same. One reason to think that he is
not misspeaking is a closely related piece of textual evidence, which
has not been emphasized in the secondary literature: on both oc-
casions when Socrates states his conclusion (  – and  
 All translations of the Euthyphro are from Grube in Cooper, Complete Works,
modified by me.  See n.  above.
 See Sharvy, ‘Analysis’, – and –, and Judson, ‘Carried’,  n.  and
 n. , where Judson says ‘the argument’s steadfast reliance on dependence makes
it much more plausible that Plato here simply takes definition to introduce a de-
pendence relation than that his use of “the same” is philosophically scrupulous or
careful’.
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–), he says that Euthyphro’s proposal cannot be correct because
the holy and the god-loved have turned out to be different (ἕτερον,
  ; παντάπασιν ἑτέρω,   ) from one another. This gives us
reason to think that the use of the term ‘the same’ was not a slip
on Socrates’ part. If this is right, then Socrates is saying in the
above passage that we can move from () to (a) and from () to
(a) because the holy is the same as the god-loved. The most na-
tural way to understand this is that Socrates is directly substituting
the one term for the other, because he thinks they are the same on
Euthyphro’s account. In Section  I discuss further the Aristotelian
interpretation’s difficulty accounting for this passage.
On the strict identity interpretation we can understand Socrates’
refutation of Euthyphro’s proposal this way. According to (), the
fact that something is holy is prior to the fact that it is loved by
the gods. According to (), the fact that something is god-loved is
posterior to the fact that it is loved by the gods. But if the holy is
the god-loved, then the very same fact, that something is holy/god-
loved, would have to be prior and posterior to another fact, that it
is loved by the gods. This leads to the two contradictions given the
asymmetric pairs () and (), which ensure that the one fact cannot
be both prior and posterior to the other.
. Substitution concerns
There is a well-known concern with Socrates’ argument if it works
as I have suggested. The concern has to do with how it substitutes
‘holy’ and ‘god-loved’ for one another. In general, you can substi-
tute terms in a sentence for one another without changing its truth-
value as long as the terms refer to the same thing. But this is not
always true within the sort of linguistic context created by the use
of ‘because’. Geach’s  paper sparked the concern that Socra-
tes’ argument illicitly makes such a substitution; this concern con-
sumed much of the debate in the s and s, as chronicled
by Wolfsdorf. In this section I argue that the strict identity in-
terpretation can allow for direct substitution within the argument
 Aristotelian interpreters might try to defend their account by offering a looser
notion of sameness. I argue against this idea, and more broadly argue that they can-
not provide a satisfactory account of this passage, at the end of sect. .
 J. Brown, ‘The Logic of Euthyphro  – ’, Philosophical Quarterly, 
(), –, raises the pertinent issues, but was not influential in the way that
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without running into this sort of substitution problem. By con-
trast, the Aristotelian account cannot interpret these as direct sub-
stitutions, as its proponents acknowledge. In the next section I go
through the details of why they cannot interpret these as direct
substitutions, and how they interpret the argument to avoid do-
ing so.
Socrates, of course, does not think of himself as substituting
within a special linguistic context. He is not focused on the lin-
guistic phenomena, but rather on what his language refers to. The
worry is that he makes a mistake, perhaps in part because he is
not attentive to the linguistic phenomena. For simplicity’s sake,
consider just one of the transitions, from  to a:
() The holy is loved because it is holy.
(a) The god-loved is loved because it is god-loved.
This seems to substitute ‘god-loved’ directly for ‘holy’ within the
scope of a because clause. Such a substitution is often thought to be
a problem on the assumption that this use of ‘because’ indicates the
gods’ reasons for loving and typically you cannot make such sub-
stitutions within a description of someone’s reasons. If Oedipus
is happy because he sees his wife, that does not mean he is happy
because he sees his mother, even though his wife is his mother.
However, we do not need to take the ‘because’ to pick out the
gods’ reasons in Socrates’ argument, and there are good reasons for
not doing so. Evans and Wolfsdorf have argued persuasively that
Socrates is not substituting within a problematic context, arguing
instead that the ‘because’ indicates the objective feature of the world
that explains why the gods love, rather than the gods’ reasons as
such. This strategy allows us to sidestep the question of how Soc-
rates, in the Euthyphro, would address the sort of problems that
can arise from substituting in problematic contexts. Note that while
Evans and Wolfsdorf accept an identity interpretation and they are
the ones who argued for this at greatest length, the Aristotelian in-
terpretation also accepts that ‘because’ in the argument indicates
an objective explanatory relation. In fact, as we shall see, these re-
lations play a crucial role in their reconstruction of the argument.
Geach, ‘Commentary’, was. Wolfsdorf, ‘Study’, –, describes the secondary
literature in the s and s.
 See Geach, ‘Commentary’, and Cohen, ‘Definition’.
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Here, briefly, are the basic reasons for accepting this way of inter-
preting ‘because’ in the argument. Socrates treats the ‘because’ in
() and () in the same way as the ‘because’ in () and (). If he used
different types of ‘because’ in this argument, it would equivocate.
This provides good reason to treat ‘because’ uniformly in the argu-
ment, if possible. The ‘because’ in () and () clearly has nothing to
do with the gods’ reasons; as mentioned earlier, it links the recipient
of an action with the resulting affection. () and () involve an (ob-
jective) explanatory relation and so we should expect the ‘because’
in () and () to do so also. In short, we can take the ‘because’ to
pick out an objective explanatory relation, and if we do so Socrates’
argument does not equivocate and it does not run into problems
with substitution, whereas if we interpret it as picking out the gods’
reasons, the argument faces both problems.
How shouldwe understand these objective explanatory relations?
The ‘because’ in () indicates what, in fact, leads the gods to love
these things: their being holy. What I am calling an ‘explanatory
relation’ some (e.g. Judson and Evans) call a ‘dependence relation’
and others (e.g. Sharvy and Wolfsdorf) a ‘causal’ or ‘aetiological’
relation (in the Platonic sense of ‘cause’). Using their language,
we could say that the gods’ love depends on its being holy or that
the cause of the gods’ love is that it is holy. While it is no doubt
true that gods have reasons for loving, when Socrates says that the
god loves them ‘because they are holy’, this ‘because’ is not look-
ing for reasons, in particular. Plato, like Aristotle, tends simply to
assume that we can understand the notion of one thing being be-
 For more detailed arguments see Evans, ‘Lessons’, –, and Wolfsdorf,
‘Study’, – and –.
 Cohen, ‘Definition’, presents an ingenious way to make the argument not equi-
vocate, but which requires the applications of asymmetry to have different senses of
‘because’ (between () and () and between () and ()). This makes it impossible to
see how Socrates can assume asymmetry, doing such things as inferring from one
claim to its asymmetric pair.
 I have reservations about explaining this use of ‘because’ in terms of Platonic
causes. Plato in the Phaedo ( ) and the Cratylus ( ) says that a cause answers
the ‘because of what?’ question.He explains what hemeans by a cause in terms of be-
cause relations, so it is not clear that we should try to understand because relations,
in turn, in terms of causes. He does not use the language of causes in the Euthy-
phro. Of course, perhaps some of the substantive things Socrates says about causes
could help us understand this use of ‘because’. But that would require an argument
to establish. Simply calling them Platonic causes does not help.
 That said, sometimes reasons are the objective things in the world that explain
something.
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cause of another without offering an account of what exactly this
means. In the Euthyphro Socrates does not explicitly tell us how
he is thinking about these relations. Instead, he provides a series
of examples: something is carried (passive participle) because it is
being carried (finite verb), something is led because it is being led,
something is seen because it is being seen, and in general something
is changed or affected because it is being changed or affected ( 
–  ). He uses these examples to motivate claims () and (). He
then treats this as the same sort of ‘because’ relation that is found
in () and ().
While these explanatory relations play an important role across
the Platonic and Aristotelian corpus, and in philosophers inspired
by them, they are quite controversial. It is controversial whether
we should accept that there are such relations at all, and if we
accept that there are some, it is controversial where they occur.
For example, Matt Evans accepts that there are explanatory rela-
tions, but doubts that there is such a relation between the active
fact that one thing affects another and the passive fact that this
thing is affected. Among contemporary philosophers, there has
recently been significant interest in grounding, which seems to be a
related sort of explanatory relation. But even Schaffer, a prominent
proponent of grounding, has recently doubted the ability to define
it, instead suggesting that we understand it through paradigm
instances, glosses, and a formal structure. Arguably, Plato and
Aristotle provide an account of how to understand explanatory re-
lations when they provide their accounts of causes in places such as
the Phaedo, the Physics, and the Posterior Analytics. But there is no
reason to think that Socrates in the Euthyphro is relying on a more
theoretically developed account, rather than an intuitive grasp.
Let us suppose, then, that the ‘because’ is picking out an objec-
tive explanatory relation and return to our concern with substitu-
tion. There may still seem to be a problem when substituting terms
 Dimas, ‘Revisited’,  n. , agrees that it is hard to determine exactly what Soc-
rates means by these relations, noting that for purposes of the argument the most
important point is that ‘because’ is asymmetric.
 For an account of why it is reasonable to think that () and () are true see Evans,
‘Lessons’, –.
 Ibid. –.
 J. Schaffer, ‘Grounding in the Image of Causation’, Philosophical Studies, 
(), –. This programme for the paper is laid out on page , and the use of
‘because’ in the Euthyphro is given as an example on page .
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such as ‘god-loved’ and ‘holy’ within because contexts. Consider,
for example:
She healed my arm because she is a doctor.
This need not indicate the reasons that motivated her to heal me.
She may have done it for money or fame or out of obligation. But
the relevant factor that allowed her to heal me is that she is a doctor
and so it is because she is a doctor that she healed me. Nonetheless,
problems can arise if we substitute something that, let us suppose,
is coextensive with ‘doctor’:
She healed my arm because she is a member of the best-paid
profession.
Even if we suppose that doctors are the best-paid professionals, this
is not a valid inference. It is not in virtue of being well paid that doc-
tors can heal. Given that we cannot make the above substitution,
what justifies the move from () to (a)?
There is an important disanalogy between Socrates’ substitutions
and this example. ‘Doctor’ and ‘member of the best-paid profes-
sion’ do not pick out the very same thing. This is why they cannot
generally be substituted within objective uses of ‘because’. By con-
trast, on the strict identity interpretationEuthyphro is claiming that
god-loved and holy are not merely coextensive, but the very same
feature, which is why if something holds because of one of them, it
holds because of the other. The idea is that all such substitutions
are fine as long as they are not within a problematic context, and
explanatory relations do not generate such a context.
Scholars frequently claim that Socrates allows ‘god-loved’ and
‘holy’ to be substituted for one another because, by hypothesis, one
is a definition of the other. However, this does not help us under-
stand why he thinks he can substitute these terms, since it is un-
clear how he thinks about what we call ‘definitions’. He does not
use a term that means definition in the dialogue. Part of what is at
issue is how Socrates thinks of an answer to the ‘what is it?’ ques-
tion. Socrates’ stated reason for allowing the substitutions is that
on this proposal the holy and the god-loved are the same. If f-ness
and g-ness are the very same thing, f and g should be in all the same
 e.g. Cohen, ‘Definition’, , and W. Mann, ‘Piety: Lending a Hand to Euthy-
phro’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,  (), – at .
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relations, including the objective dependence relation indicated by
this use of ‘because’.
. The Aristotelian account of the argument
The Aristotelian interpretation does not accept that ‘the god-loved’
and ‘the holy’ pick out the very same thing. Does it offer a convin-
cing account of Socrates’ apparent substitutions in the argument?
It might seem that the Aristotelian interpretation could accept
substituting ‘holy’ and ‘god-loved’ for each other in sentences with
these sorts of ‘because’ claim, since on this interpretation the holy
and the god-loved are quite similar to one another, even if they
are not strictly the same. However, there are good reasons why
this interpretation cannot allow these substitutions, as its defenders
acknowledge. This is ultimately due to the interpretation’s central
claim that if g-ness is what f-ness is, then every f is f because it is
g. This claim, when applied to Euthyphro’s proposal, yields:
() The holy is holy because it is god-loved.
It is important to realize that this statement, (), is never made in
the Euthyphro. Euthyphro does agree to (), that the holy is holy
because it is loved by the gods. But, as we have seen, this is very dif-
ferent from the claim that the holy is holy because it is god-loved.
Socrates’ argument relies crucially on the difference between ‘god-
loved’ and ‘is loved by the gods’; premisses () and () focus en-
tirely on the relation between these. () is an interpretative posit of
the Aristotelian interpretation, not accepted by the strict identity
interpretation.
Judson thinks we can assume () plays a role in Socrates’ elen-
chus from the fact that other dependence claims are made in the
argument:
There are many items in this matrix [of things that involve dependence
relations], all but one invoked by the term ‘because’: Socrates and Euthy-
phro use ὅτι, διότι, and διά interchangeably for this purpose, over  times
in our passage (a–b). Only one item is not so invoked—Euthyphro’s
definition itself, which enters the matrix at e–. I think we should in-
fer that Socrates, as Plato presents him here, construes definition as itself
involving dependence. . . .
 Judson, ‘Carried’, .
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Judson treats Socrates’ frequent use of ‘because’ language in the
passage as evidence that Socrates thinks that Euthyphro’s defini-
tion itself is supposed to involve dependence (between the definiens,
the god-loved, and the definiendum, the holy). Judson relies on this
dependence relation in his reconstruction of Socrates’ refutation.
But if the evidence Judson cites warrants anything, it is the oppo-
site inference. As Judson notes, Socrates is more than willing to
use ‘because’ language in this argument. If he had wanted to say
that Euthyphro’s account itself requires dependence, it would have
been quite natural for him to do so. The fact that he mentions other
dependence relations certainly does not give us any reason to infer
that he thinks that there is a dependence relation between holy and
god-loved.
The Aristotelian interpretation’s commitment to () is why they
cannot accept that Socrates is simply substituting ‘holy’ and ‘god-
loved’ for one another in sentences such as () and (). Suppose
that Socrates did allow for substitutions within sentences with these
sorts of because clause. Then the Aristotelian interpretation would
be committed to these claims:
() The holy is holy because it is god-loved.
(a) The holy is god-loved because it is holy (substituting ‘holy’
for ‘god-loved’ and vice versa in ()).
But, given asymmetry, this leads to a contradiction. The asymmet-
ric correlate of () is:
() It is not the case that the holy is god-loved because it is holy.
() is the denial of (a). Intuitively, we can think of the problem
this way: if being god-loved is the underlying explanation for being
holy, then being holy cannot be the underlying explanation for be-
ing god-loved; but if you allowed intersubstitution of ‘god-loved’
and ‘holy’ within because contexts, then we could move from one
explanation to the other.
Note that contradictions of the sort found between (a) and
() could be generated for any proposed answer to a ‘what is it?’
question—even a correct one. Thus, the Aristotelian interpreta-
tion cannot suggest that this is a result of Euthyphro’s proposal
 The simple substitution strategy also results in claims like this:
(b) The holy is holy because it is holy.
This runs into direct problems with asymmetry.
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being flawed. The problem arises from accepting asymmetry,
the Aristotelian interpretation, and the ability to substitute such
terms directly. Formally, the contradiction comes about as follows.
Suppose g-ness is what f-ness is. Then
(A) The f is f because it is g. (Aristotelian interpretation)
(B) The f is g because it is f . (Direct substitution on A)
(C) It is not the case that the f is g because it is f . (Asymmetric
correlate of A)
Contradiction (between B and C).
This is why proponents of the Aristotelian interpretation acknow-
ledge that they cannot allow direct substitution, denying B. The
strict identity interpretation, by contrast, avoids this contradiction
by denying A.
Since Sharvy and Judson realize that their interpretation is in-
compatible with direct substitution, they suggest instead that Soc-
rates is committed to a form of transitivity that, along with (), al-
lows one to justify the transition from () to (a) and () to (a).
The relevant form of transitivity is the claim that if something is b
because it is c and it is c because it is d, then it is b because it is d.
The idea is that if () the holy is holy because it is god-loved and
() it is god-loved because it is loved by the gods, then (a) the holy
is holy because it is loved by the gods. We can reach (a) using a
similar application of transitivity. The Aristotelian interpretation
sees the answer to the ‘what is f-ness?’ question as prior to f-ness,
and so appeals to transitivity, while the strict identity interpretation
sees the answer as identical, and so appeals to substitution.
This use of transitivity is clever but highly speculative. Socrates
never mention (), and he never mentions or presupposes transi-
tivity elsewhere in the Euthyphro. This requires Socrates to rely
on two different claims he never makes in the dialogue to justify a
somewhat sophisticated move from () to (a) and () to (a). In-
stead, what Socrates says to justify the move from () to (a) and
 Sharvy, ‘Analysis’,  ff., and Judson, ‘Carried’, .
 We reach (a) as follows:
() The holy is loved because it is holy.
() The holy is holy because it is god-loved.
The first instance of ‘holy’ in () is not part of a because context, so we can substitute
it on Sharvy’s and Judson’s accounts. Therefore, by transitivity:
(a) The god-loved is loved because it is god-loved.
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() to (a) is that the holy and the god-loved are the same, as we
saw in the passage at   –  . The interpretation with better
textual evidence, then, is that Socrates is simply substituting one
term for the other because he accepts strict identity. It might seem
open for Socrates to have a looser notion of sameness, such as Aris-
totle’s sameness in number. If he did, then perhaps in saying that
the god-loved and the holy are the same, he would be leaving open
that something could be holy because it is god-loved. But there is no
evidence for this sort of loose notion of sameness in the Euthyphro,
and elsewhere in the dialogue ‘same’ seems to refer to strict iden-
tity. At   – Socrates says, ‘or is the holy itself not the same as
itself in every action?’. He then says that forms such as this are each
one thing (  –). The word ‘same’ here is naturally read asmean-
ing strict identity: the form of holiness is exactly the same thing in
the different actions. More importantly, a looser notion of same-
ness makes it impossible to understand the inference drawn from
  –  , where Socrates cites their being the same to license
the move from () to (a) and from () to (a). If he were operat-
ing with a looser notion of sameness, he would not be entitled to
these inferences, since in general you cannot preserve truth while
substituting two things that are only loosely the same. This is seen
in the example of substituting ‘member of the best-paid profession’
for ‘doctor’: this substitution does not preserve truth, even though
these two are loosely the same (since they are coextensive).
Thus, the Aristotelian interpretation faces three successive prob-
lems making sense of   –  . First, it has trouble explaining
why Socrates would say in any context that the holy and the god-
loved are the same. Second, it has trouble explaining why Socrates
says that they are the same where he does: in justifying the transfor-
mations from () to (a) and () to (a), which on the Aristotelian
interpretation have nothing to do with sameness. And third, if they
attribute to Socrates a looser sense of sameness, such a sense would
be too weak to justify the transformations.
. Apparent advantages of the Aristotelian interpretation
We have seen that there are textual difficulties with the Aristotelian
interpretation and direct evidence for the strict identity interpre-
tation. However, several considerations seem to favour the Aristo-
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telian account. Seeing how the strict identity account can address
these will help fill out this interpretation. In this section I address
three textual considerations that seem to favour the Aristotelian
account: (i) Socrates’ opening question in the argument discussed
above; (ii) his distinction between an ousia (being) and a pathos (af-
fection); and (iii) the way forms are described near the beginning
of the dialogue. Clarifying the strict identity account in the light of
these considerations will allow us, in the next section, to distinguish
the strict identity interpretation from other similar interpretations
and to explore some questions that naturally arise on the strict iden-
tity view. In Section  I address a fourth, broader consideration that
seems to favour the Aristotelian interpretation: (iv) the expectation
that answers to the ‘what is it?’ question should be informative.
It is common to take Socrates’ famous opening question as
spelling out the consequences if Euthyphro’s answer were right:
ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὅσιόν ἐστιν;
(  –)
Is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is
loved?
On this reading of the question, Socrates is suggesting that if Euthy-
phro’s answerwere correct, then the holywould be holy because it is
loved.This would seem to support the Aristotelian interpretation.
But notice that in the question Socrates here assumes asymmetry
and asks Euthyphro whether he accepts () or denies (), treating
these as incompatible alternatives. He is asking Euthyphro why the
gods love holy things. As we have seen, there is an important dif-
ference between god-loved and loved by the gods. The Aristotelian
interpretation understands Euthyphro’s proposal as (): the holy is
holy because it is god-loved. The opening question is about whether
the holy is loved, not about whether it is god-loved; thus, even ac-
cording to the Aristotelian interpretation the opening question does
not spell out the consequences if Euthyphro is right. On either in-
terpretation, Socrates’ opening question asks a substantive theo-
logical question. Euthyphro does not understand the question at
first, which leads Socrates to approach the issue in a different way.
But when he returns to the question at   – Euthyphro finds it
 See e.g. Cohen, ‘Definition’, . Evans, ‘Lessons’, , claims that this question
‘poses an important challenge to Euthyphro’s Answer’.
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easy to answer it: the gods love holy things because they are holy,
and so he agrees to ().
The next consideration that seems to favour the Aristotelian
interpretation is Socrates’ distinction between ousia (being) and
pathos (affection) at the end of the argument. On some readings, for
example Wolfsdorf’s, Socrates is telling us the ontological status
of the thing he is looking for: he wants something ontologically
fundamental, an ousia, not a pathos. This sort of reading fits
naturally with the Aristotelian interpretation’s idea that an answer
to the ‘what is it?’ question should be explanatorily prior. But this
is a misreading of Socrates’ distinction between ousia and pathos.
Socrates’ complaint is this:
καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ ᾿ ἐστίν, τὴν μὲν οὐ-
σίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅτι πέπονθε
τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ὅτι δὲ ὄν, οὔπω εἶπες. (  – )
And I’m afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what the holy is, you
did not wish to make its ousia clear to me, but you mentioned a pathos of
it [περὶ αὐτοῦ], that the holy possesses this pathos [πέπονθε], being loved by
all the gods, but you have not yet told me what the holy is.
Note that Socrates’ contrast is not between providing a pathos and
an ousia; it is between providing a pathos of the holy and an ousia
of the holy. For all this says, the holy might be a pathos. But then
Socrates would want the ousia of this pathos, not some pathos of this
pathos. This is the first extant philosophical use of the word ousia in
Greek literature, which adds to the difficulty in knowing what Plato
means by it. Grammatically, it is an abstract noun formed from
the participle of the verb ‘to be’. At the end of the passage Socrates
treats not providing the ousia of the holy as equivalent to not saying
what it is. In saying what the holy is, you are providing the being of
the holy. A pathos of the holy, by contrast, is something that is true
of the holy, but is not what the holy is; instead, it is something else
that holds of it. This distinction between what something is and the
affections it has is independent of whether the thing in question is
ontologically fundamental. For example, suppose that purple is not
fundamental, but rather dependent on blue and red (which may de-
 Wolfsdorf, ‘Study’, –. For example, on page  Wolfsdorf suggests that
for Hippias gold might be something’s ousia, whereas other affections would be
pathē.
 For a discussion of this see F.-G. Herrmann, Words and Ideas: The Roots of
Plato’s Philosophy (Oxford, ), ch. .
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pend on other things in turn). In asking what purple is, we are not
supposing that the being of purple is fundamental; it depends on
blue and red.Nonetheless, we want the being of purple, not some
affection of it, such as its being the colour of royalty. Thus, when
Socrates says that he is looking for an ousia, he is not restricting the
ontological status of the thing in question.
The third consideration that seems to favour the Aristotelian in-
terpretation is Socrates’ initial descriptions of what he is looking for
in an answer to ‘what is the holy?’ (  –  and   – , quoted
below). In these descriptions Socrates suggests that an answer must
have a sort of priority. This seems to support the Aristotelian in-
terpretation. I shall argue that Socrates is requiring a different sort
of explanatory priority from that proposed by the Aristotelian in-
terpretation. Socrates requires an answer to the ‘what is f-ness?’
question to be prior to the f-things. This is compatible with both
theAristotelian and the strict identity interpretations. Socrates calls
the thing picked out by a correct answer to ‘what is f-ness?’ a ‘form’
in the Euthyphro (εἶδος   , ἰδέα    and   ). As we shall see,
Socrates says that it is by the form of f-ness that every f-thing is f .
Note how this is distinct from the claim made by the Aristotelian
interpretation, according to which an answer must pick out some
distinct feature, g (let us suppose proportion), which explains why f
things are f . Instead, Socrates is requiring that f things (e.g. beau-
tiful things) are f (beautiful) because of f-ness (beauty).
Socrates’ first description of what he wants from an answer to
‘what is the holy?’ raises a number of interpretative difficulties.
Many of these difficulties are settled by his next description, so it
is easiest to consider these two passages together. Our primary in-
terest is in the sense in which an answer to ‘what is the holy?’ should
be explanatory.
νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι ὃ νυνδὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι διισχυρίζου, ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς
φῂς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν
ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ μὲν ὁσίου παντὸς
ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν
ὅτιπερ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι; (  – )
So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you clearly knew,
 See the end of sect.  for a discussion of whether there are forms for things such
as purple. For my purposes it does not matter whether Socrates would accept that
there is such a form—it is merely an illustrative example.
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what sort of thing do you say the pious and the impious are, as regards
both murder and other things? Or is the holy itself not the same as itself in
every action, and the unholy in turn the opposite of all of the holy, and it-
self similar to itself, and whatever is going to be unholy has some one form
[ἰδέαν] according to its unholiness?
μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελευόμην, ἕν τι ἢ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν
ὁσίων, ἀλλ ᾿ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν; ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾷ
ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια· ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις; (  – )
Recall that I did not bid you to do this, to teach me one or two of the holy
things, but to teach me that form [εἶδος] itself by which all the holy things
are holy. For you said, I suppose, that by one form [ἰδέᾳ] both the unholy
things are unholy and the holy things are holy. Or don’t you remember?
The first passage makes a number of claims about the holy and the
unholy, including the claims that the holy itself is the same as itself
in every action, the unholy is opposite of all of the holy, and the un-
holy itself is like itself. For our purposes the most important claim
is at the end of the passage: everything that is going to be unholy has
some one form. Socrates clarifies this claim and seemingly expands
upon it in the second passage, which can only be referring back to
the first when Socrates says, ‘Recall that . . .’. According to this se-
cond passage, when Socrates asks ‘What is the holy?’ he is asking
for the form, and this form will tell us by what (causal dative) all
the holy things are holy.
Wolfsdorf, citing the first passage, says that the form is ‘a holy
thing insofar as it is holy’. According to his account, f-ness just
is an f-thing in so far as it is f . It is illuminating to see why this
cannot be correct. Socrates says in the above passages that a form is
something that holy things have. It is in the holy actions. It is by the
form that holy things are holy. The form of the holy in the Euthy-
phro is not a way of picking out a holy thing, as it is on Wolfsdorf’s
proposal. The form is more distinct from the individual holy things
than Wolfsdorf allows. Calling someone a ‘builder’ picks her out in
so far as she builds. A builder does not also have a builder in her
that is the same in every builder. By contrast, every holy action has
the same form in it. f-things are not the same as f-ness; they have
f-ness in them. Moreover, Socrates says that it is by the form that
the holy things are holy. But there is not this sort of explanatory dis-
 Note that Socrates here treats ‘the pious’ and ‘the impious’ (τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ τὸ
ἀσεβές) as synonyms for ‘the holy’ and ‘the unholy’ (τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον).
 Wolfsdorf, ‘Study’, –, emphasis original.
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tance between a thing and that-thing-in-so-far-as-it-is-that-thing:
it is not the case that a builder is a builder because of the builder-in-
so-far-as-she-is-a-builder. A better candidate to explain why every
builder is a builder is that each has the same thing in her: the craft
of building. The form is more like the craft than the craftsman.
The Aristotelian interpretation seems to have a straightforward
account of how the form explains why all holy things are holy:
it provides a distinct feature that is prior to and explanatory of
holiness.By contrast, on the strict identity interpretation the form
is not something prior to holiness. How, then, can it explain why
holy things are holy? Instead of picking out some distinct feature,
Socrates is identifying the relation between the form of holiness and
the various holy things. The holy things are holy because of some-
thing they all have in common. There is something that is the same
in every holy thing and it is because of this that each of them is holy.
This thing is the holiness that they each have. In saying that holy
things are holy ‘by’ this holiness, Socrates is not picking out some
further feature they have, some feature prior to being holy. Instead,
he is pointing to something akin to the relation between a universal
and a particular or between a type and a token. He is prioritizing
the thing that is the same in all cases; this thing explains why the
particular cases are the way they are. More specifically, he is saying
that each holy thing is holy because of some same thing they each
have in them. This is the being (ousia) of holiness, what the holy
is. Socrates does not know what this is. That is what he is trying to
determine when he asks ‘what is the holy?’.
 See Sharvy, ‘Analysis’, . While not a proponent of the Aristotelian inter-
pretation, Cohen, ‘Definition’, , thinks that the distinction drawn here is the same
as the one drawn in the argument from    to   . See the footnote at the end
of this paragraph for a discussion of how straightforward, in fact, the Aristotelian
account is.
 I say ‘akin to’ because universals or types are not quite like forms as described
in the Euthyphro. A token is an instance, and Socrates is not saying that the form
explains an instance of the form. If Socrates thinks there are instances of forms,
these would be in particular holy things. However, the form is not said to explain
something in a holy thing, but rather why the holy thing is holy. Again, we can use
the analogy with the builder. The universal builder is not the same as the craft of
building, although it is akin to the craft. The craft of building relates to the various
builders not as type to token, but in a way akin to this. To put it in a linguistic mode,
the form of holiness explains the predicate ‘holy’, not some specific holiness found
in holy things.
 How straightforward is the Aristotelian interpretation’s account here? Accord-
ing to it, the form indicates a prior feature, g, that explains why things are f . But note
that simply identifying this prior feature does not explain how the form of f-ness
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Why does Socrates think the form of holiness is explanatorily
prior to the various holy things? Unfortunately, he does not defend
this claim here. Since the Euthyphro, the existence and nature of
so-called abstract entities has been one of the most enduring philo-
sophical topics. The best we can do, for purposes of understanding
the Euthyphro, is bring out the idea’s intuitive appeal. We ask ‘what
is holiness?’ because we think that we can identify something that
explains why each holy thing is holy. There is something all holy
things have in common and it is because of this that each of them is
holy. The existence of such a thing seems presupposed by our using
the same predicate for several things. While most people find such
a view intuitive, many philosophers have denied that there are uni-
versals, and so a fortiori denied this sort of priority. So it is worth
noting that in the Euthyphro Socrates does not simply assume that
there are such things. As we saw in Socrates’ first mention of forms
(  – ), Socrates asks Euthyphro whether he agrees that there
is such a thing.
. Prior features and strict identity
I have argued that three textual considerations that seem to sup-
port the Aristotelian interpretation are, in fact, neutral between it
and the strict identity interpretation. In this section I first argue
that some scholars who accept an identity interpretation do not ad-
here to it when they consider the possibility that there is a feature
prior to being holy. After arguing for this, I discuss whether Soc-
rates allows for such prior features in the Euthyphro, and if so, how
to think of them.
While several scholars have accepted some sort of identity inter-
pretation, they often do not adhere to it consistently. For example,
Cohen in his classic article accepts that an answer to ‘what is holi-
relates to individual f-things. It is open to the Aristotelian interpreter to say that the
form of f-ness both (i) identifies a prior feature, g, that explains why f-things are f ,
and (ii) is prior to f-things in a way akin to the priority of universal to particular. But
it is worth seeing that these are two different sorts of explanatory task, which can be
separated and are separated on the strict identity interpretation. Once we see these
as distinct, it is no longer clear that the Aristotelian interpretation has a particularly
straightforward account. The strict identity interpretation has a cleaner division of
labour: the form only explains the relation between f-ness and f-things. I would like
to thank David Bronstein for suggesting that I bring this out.
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ness?’ should pick out the same thing as holiness.Then, at the end
of his article, he says:
[Socrates’ argument] only proves that ‘pious’ cannot be defined as ‘god-
loved’ if the gods’ reason for loving what is pious is that it is pious. Does
this amount to proving that ‘pious’ cannot be defined as ‘god-loved’ if the
gods have a reason for loving what is pious? No; the gods might have other
reasons for loving what is pious. But this implication is clear at any rate:
if the gods do have reasons for loving what is pious, it is to these reasons
that we should look in trying to define ‘pious’. If the gods have a reason
for loving pious acts, it will be that these acts have, or are thought by the
gods to have, certain features. It is these features, then, that should serve
to define piety.
Cohen imagines that the gods love the pious because it possesses
some features other than its being pious—let us suppose because
it is pure and harmonious. At the end of the passage he says that
these features should serve to define piety. By hypothesis, these are
features distinct from being pious. Supposedly they should serve to
define piety because the gods recognize them as the ultimate basis
for things being pious. This commits Cohen to the Aristotelian in-
terpretation, and in any event it is incompatible with his commit-
ment to an identity interpretation.
In a similar but more complicated discussion, Evans also sug-
gests answering ‘what is piety?’ in terms of a feature strictly prior
to being pious, despite being a strong proponent of an identity in-
terpretation earlier in his article. It takes a bit of unpacking to see
that Evans is committed to this. In a hypothetical argument against
Euthyphro’s position he says:
For if there is some property of pious things that makes the gods love them,
and thereby also makes them pious then presumably it is this property that
Socrates has been looking for all along.
In order to justify the ‘thereby’ in the italicized part of the passage
Evans says that the relevant dependence relations are transitive.
While the simple use of a transitive relation need not lead to an
 Cohen, ‘Definition’, e.g. .
 Ibid. , emphasis original.
 This arises in Evans’s defence of what he calls ‘foundation’: Evans, ‘Lessons’,
–.
 Ibid. , emphasis original.  Ibid.  n. .
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Aristotelian interpretation, in this case it does. Evans is using a tran-
sitive relation to draw this sort of connection:
Property P makes the gods love (l) pious things. (Hypothesis)
The gods loving (l) pious things makes them pious. (True on
Euthyphro’s proposal)
Therefore: Property P makes the pious things pious.
Note that P is prior to feature l, which is prior to their being pious.
P counts as an answer to ‘what is piety?’ only on the Aristotelian in-
terpretation, not the strict identity interpretation, since it answers
‘what is the pious?’ using some feature prior to being pious. The
above passage is part of Evans’s argument that Euthyphro’s pro-
posal is problematic because it does not make the form the founda-
tional basis for things being pious. But why should a form provide
such a basis? According to Euthyphro’s proposal, being pious is
something explanatorily posterior: it is explained by the fact that
the gods love it. Thus, according to the strict identity interpreta-
tion, Euthyphro’s account should identify something that is expla-
natorily posterior.
Below I explore an idea raised by Cohen and Evans: that there is
some feature prior to being holy. But before I do so, we should con-
sider a question. I have argued that there is one explanatory rela-
tion between the form of f-ness and f-things, and another between
f-things and g-things, when g is prior to f . The question is whether
Socrates thinks that there is the same type of explanatory relation
 It is unclear whether property P is prior to loving in the way that the form of
f-ness is prior to f-things, or in the way that one feature can be prior to another. But
for our purposes it does not matter, since Evans claims that loving is prior to being
pious, and that property P explains loving. This commits him to the Aristotelian
interpretation, because the form explains one feature (loving) which is prior to the
feature in question (being pious).
 Evans provides the above argument, which relies on the Aristotelian interpre-
tation, in explaining and defending Socrates’ claim that the pious is loved because it
is pious (which he calls ‘object priority’). I think Evans provides a different, much
stronger defence of this claim (on pages –) and so the above argument (for what
he calls ‘foundation’) is unnecessary. In this other defence he points out that earlier
in the dialogue Socrates has suggested that the gods, in loving, are responding to
the perceived goodness of things, which is manifest in their holiness. This (along
with the gods’ accurate beliefs about what is good) explains why the gods love pi-
ous things because they are pious. Note that this does not require the argument (for
foundation) discussed above; as Evans himself notes, it requires only a commitment
to a type of Socratic intellectualism and the cognitive accuracy of the gods.
 I would like to thank Matt Evans for pressing me on the questions in this para-
graph and the next.
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in these two cases. He does not explicitly distinguish different types
of explanation in the Euthyphro. At first, it might seem that he uses
different explanatory vocabulary in the two cases. In the earlier pas-
sage (  – ) he uses the causal dative for the relation between the
form of f-ness and f-things. By contrast, in the argument at  
–   he typically uses ‘because’ (ὅτι or διότι) and ‘because of
this’ (διὰ τοῦτο), where ‘this’ (τοῦτο) refers to a clause introduced
with ‘because’ (ὅτι or διότι). However, Socrates does use a causal
dative once in the argument. He says that something is god-loved
‘because it is loved by the gods’ and then paraphrases this as ‘by this
being loved itself ’ (αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι,   –). While there
is this overlap in Socrates’ explanatory vocabulary, we can distin-
guish these two uses of ‘because’ in a different way: one of them
picks out a single thing, a form, expressed with a noun (typically
formed with an article and adjective—‘the holy’); the other picks
out a state of affairs expressed with a subject, verb, and sometimes
a predicate or prepositional phrase (e.g. ‘it is loved by the gods’).
Thus, while it is not clear whether Socrates thought there were two
different types of explanatory relation, he does express them dif-
ferently.
Whether or not these are the same sorts of explanatory relation,
Socrates’ account in the Euthyphro seems, at least on the face of it,
to allow for two explanations for the same fact. Consider the fact
that every holy thing is holy. As we saw, Socrates does not object to
Euthyphro’s proposal on the grounds that it allows something to be
prior to being holy.Moreover, as we saw, Cohen and Evans are open
to the possibility of there being something prior in their arguments.
Suppose that holy things are holy because they are harmonious. If
so, then on the strict identity interpretation there would be two ex-
planations for the same fact: the holy things would be holy both
because of the form of holiness and because they are harmonious.
We could avoid having these two explanations by denying that
there is a form of holiness if it turns out that there is some prior
feature that explains why things are holy. But Socrates never sug-
gests that this is a requirement on there being a form of holiness.
As we have seen, when Socrates asks Euthyphro whether he thinks
that there is an answer to ‘what is holiness?’, he spells out what this
 Note that in theMeno Socrates uses διά with the accusative in place of a causal
dative, in a passage (  – ) that otherwise is very similar to Socrates’ description
of forms in the Euthyphro.
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would entail: that there be a form that is the same in every holy
action, that the unholy is opposite to all that is holy, etc. He sug-
gests that meeting these conditions is sufficient for there being an
answer to ‘what is holiness?’. He never mentions a requirement that
there be no feature prior to being holy. Moreover, it is strange to
think that the ‘what is f-ness?’ question simply assumes that f has
nothing prior to it other than the form of f-ness. And if Socrates
thought this, he could have argued against Euthyphro’s proposal in
a much simpler way, pointing out that Euthyphro had not proposed
something foundational, and so must not have identified a form.
It seems to me that the most plausible conclusion is that Socrates,
as described in the Euthyphro, thinks there is a form of holiness re-
gardless of whether there is some feature that is prior to being holy.
There is another way we could avoid the possibility that there are
two explanations for why every holy thing is holy. We could simply
deny that being holy is the sort of thing that could be explained by
some prior feature. Unlike the previous option, this would not be
because of some requirement on forms, but because being holy is a
bedrock feature, not explained by any other. However, it is not clear
why Socrates would think that being holy is such a feature. This
proposal also seems to run into questions about Socrates’ profes-
sion of ignorance. If he does not know what holiness is, should he
be confident that there are no features prior to being holy? Again,
this seems to me unlikely. Instead, it seems that Socrates, as de-
scribed in the Euthyphro, should be open to double explanations in
these cases.
I have argued that Socrates seems to allow for double explana-
tions in the Euthyphro, although this position is not required by the
strict identity interpretation. If there are such double explanations,
one would like to knowwhether each explanation is, on its own, suf-
ficient. Unfortunately, Socrates simply does not explore this in the
Euthyphro. Rather than try to find answers to such questions in this
dialogue, I think it is better to view it as naturally raising questions
of this sort. We can then see the Euthyphro as setting the agenda
for later discussions of explanatory priority, especially the prior-
ity of the forms. Of course, we do not need to think that Plato in-
 I am not aware of any place in the dialogues where Socrates (or anyone else)
denies that there are forms for features that are explanatorily posterior. At Parm.
 – Socrates seems to deny that certain things have forms on the grounds that
these things are undignified andworthless ( ), not because they are explanatorily
posterior.
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tended to set this agenda when he wrote it. I have argued elsewhere
that when Socrates in the Phaedo says things such as ‘everything
larger than something else is larger because of nothing other than
largeness’ (  –) he is claiming that only the form of f-ness
explains why things are f . If this is correct, in that dialogue Soc-
rates denies that there are double explanations by denying that fea-
tures explained by forms are ever explained by anything other than
forms. By contrast, Aristotle in Physics .  (and elsewhere) sug-
gests a different position. He says that there are different types of
cause, which are each answers to the ‘because of what?’ question.
Only one of these is the form. After laying out the four types of
cause, he denies asymmetry on the grounds that A can be one type
of cause of B, while B is another type of cause of A (a–). The
Euthyphro has started a discussion of explanatory priority and the
explanatory role of forms, while leaving a number of questions un-
answered, questions which are taken up in other dialogues and by
later philosophers.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine whether
the strict identity interpretation has textual support in other dia-
logues, let me point out how it could help resolve a well-known
puzzle about the form of the beautiful. Socrates elsewhere seems
committed both to there being a form of the beautiful and to beau-
tiful things being beautiful at least in part because they are good.
It is sometimes thought that this makes the form of the beauti-
ful collapse into the form of the good. But that is only a threat
on the Aristotelian interpretation. On the strict identity interpre-
tation, the form of the beautiful picks out precisely the feature in
question, being beautiful, not the feature prior to it, being good.
As long as we allow for double explanations, there is no problem
with all beautiful things being beautiful because of the form of the
beautiful and also because they are good. While it is true that the
form of the good would indirectly explain things being beautiful,
the two forms would be doing different work. Things would be
 D. Ebrey, ‘Making Room for Matter: Material Causes in the Phaedo and the
Physics’, Apeiron,  (), –. Cf.   –,   –,   –. In this ar-
ticle I provide an account of why Plato and Aristotle have different ways of thinking
about causation in the Phaedo and the Physics, and how Aristotle’s denial of asym-
metry fits into this.
 For the question whether the beautiful and the good end up being strictly
identical see e.g. R. Barney, ‘Notes on Plato on the Kalon and the Good’, Classical
Philology,  (), – at .
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beautiful because they are good, but they would not be beautiful
because they are beautiful—we could not simply substitute ‘good’
and ‘beautiful’ for each other. The form of the beautiful would di-
rectly explain why things are beautiful; the form of the good would
do so only indirectly, through explaining why they are good.
. Why is an answer informative?
The last step in defending and fleshing out the strict identity in-
terpretation is to show how it can address a broader consideration
that seems to favour the Aristotelian interpretation. This interpre-
tation provides a very natural account of why Socrates, or anyone
else, would want an answer to the ‘what is f-ness?’ question. On the
Aristotelian interpretation an answer to this question reveals some-
thing fundamental about the nature of the f-ness and, in doing so,
explains why things are f . By contrast, the strict identity interpreta-
tion does not offer something more fundamental than f-ness. Since
it insists on providing exactly the same thing, it is hard to see why
it is illuminating at all.
One way that an answer could be illuminating is by revealing the
structure of the thing in question, which is not revealed when it is
simply called, for example, ‘the holy’. The idea is that an answer to
‘what is the holy?’ should pick out the very same thing as ‘the holy’,
but do so in a way that makes evident its structure. There is some
indication in the Euthyphro that Socrates allows that holiness may
have some such internal complexity since he suggests that it might
be a type of justice (  –;   – ). If holiness turned out to
be a type of justice, wewould learn something important aboutwhat
holiness is, without needing to think that the answer we identify is
prior to holiness. While Socrates does not provide a developed ac-
count of the sort of internal structure forms might have, he seems
to allow for some such possibility by allowing that holiness might
be a type of justice.
 In some dialogues, especially those typically identified as middle, Socrates
seems to suggest that forms have a very strict sort of unity (e.g. his claim that they
are uniform, μονοειδές, in the Phaedo at    and Symposium at   ). Aside
from the claim that the form of the unholy is ‘one’ (  ), we have no such claim in
the Euthyphro. But it is unclear what exactly these strict sorts of unity amount to,
and it is unclear whether Socrates is defending the same position in the Euthyphro
as in these other dialogues. Given this, we should not allow these claims to restrict
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Consider the answer to ‘what is swiftness?’ in the Laches: the
power to accomplish a lot in a short period of time (  – ).
One way to interpret this, in line with the Aristotelian interpreta-
tion, is as saying that this power is a more fundamental or basic
feature than being swift. However, we do not need to interpret it
this way. Instead, another option, equally compatible with the text
of the Laches, is that we learn what sort of thing swiftness is when
we learn that it is a power. And we learn how to distinguish it from
other powers when we learn that it is a power to accomplish a lot
in a short period of time. This is illuminating even if it is not pick-
ing out something explanatorily prior. On this account, swiftness
is identical to the power to accomplish a lot in a short period of
time. Of course, an account of swiftness as this power might have a
sort of epistemic priority: we might be able to tell that something is
swift because it is this sort of power. But this ‘because’ tracks our
evidence—it explains how we can tell it is swift—rather than indi-
cating an explanatory dependence between being swift and being
this sort of power.
While Socrates does not directly address how an answer can be
informative in theEuthyphro, he does make a relevant remark in the
Meno:
εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ
δὴ πρᾳότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτι-
κώτερον μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι ᾿ ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ
εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος. (  –)
But if people were willing to converse with one another as friends like you
and I now, then the answer must be gentler, as it were, and more suited to
conversation. And perhaps what is more suited to conversation is not only
to give the true answer, but also to do so in terms which the questioner has
in addition agreed he knows.
Socrates is clear here that an answer could be true but not useful
for the questioner, because it does not reveal the answer to him in a
way that he understands. Saying ‘the holy is the holy’, while true,
is not speaking in terms that the questioner has agreed he knows.
The idea on the strict identity account is that an answer to ‘what is
our interpretation of the Euthyphro. It is clear that in this dialogue he is open to
holiness being a type of justice.
 Translation from R. W. Sharples, Plato: Meno (Warminster, ), lightly
modified.
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the holy?’ should present the very same feature, but do so in terms
the questioner understands.
This passage from theMenomakes it clear that Socrates is looking
for an answer that is not only correct, but informative. Of course,
that does not mean that it is easy to provide a correct account if
we avoid tautologous claims such as ‘the holy is the holy’. As we
have seen, Socrates has a very strict constraint on a correct answer:
it cannot pick out a merely coextensive feature; it must pick out
the very feature in question. In order to be informative we need
to be careful about how we pick out this feature. We should do so
using terms the interlocutor understands. Whether an account is
correct will not depend on who the interlocutor is, but whether it is
informative will. In fact, the same issue arises for the Aristotelian
interpretation in determining how to identify a more fundamental
feature. How should someone pick out this feature? Specifying it
as ‘the feature that explains why holy things are holy’ would neces-
sarily be correct according to this interpretation, but it is not infor-
mative. We could easily formulate such an answer for any ‘what is
it?’ question. Thus, while at one level the Aristotelian interpreta-
tion seems to provide a more informative account, both interpreta-
tions need additional constraints to provide genuinely informative
answers.
In the last section and this one I have described (i) the sort of
priority the form of f-ness has and (ii) how answers to the ‘what
is it?’ question can be informative. Note how this fits with one of
Socrates’ most famous remarks in the Euthyphro:
ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέ-
πων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος
τις πράττῃ φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ ᾿ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ. (  –)
Teach me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it [ἀποβλέ-
πων] and, using it as a model [παραδείγματι], say that any action of yours or
another’s that is of that sort is holy, and if it is not that it is not.
 Note that this is compatible with my claim in sect.  that one can substitute an-
swers to ‘what is it?’ questions for each other within objective explanations. Suppose
that the holy is the fitting, but that we do not understand what it means to be fitting.
Then if it is true that ‘the holy is loved by the gods because it is holy’, then it would
also be true that ‘the fitting is loved by the gods because it is fitting’. But Socrates
would not be satisfied with this merely true account, since he would not understand
being fitting any better than he understands being holy. Evans, ‘Lessons’, , makes
a similar point. The way he puts it is that a substitution could succeed at its semantic
aim of being true while failing at its cognitive aim of being informative.
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Socrates wants Euthyphro to identify holiness in such a way that
he will be genuinely taught what it is, so that he sees it accurately
and uses this to say which actions are holy and which are not. Soc-
rates is relying on the idea that it is by the form that every holy
thing is holy, and so this form can be used to determine which ac-
tions are holy. Euthyphro would not teach him the form by saying
something tautologous such as ‘the holy is the holy’—that would
not help Socrates look upon it. Socrates does not suggest that Eu-
thyphro teach this by identifying some more fundamental feature
that makes holy things holy. He is looking for something that can
be used as a model. A model typically does not have more funda-
mental features than what it is a model of; it simply has the features
we would expect in a perfect specimen. In short, it fits perfectly
with the strict identity view to think that Socrates wants a model
and that if he is taught this model he will be able to look upon it to
determine which things are holy.
. Conclusion
I have argued that Socrates in the Euthyphro thinks that an answer
to ‘what is f-ness?’ should pick out exactly f-ness, not something
prior to it. I find this is an appealing account of how to understand
the ‘what is it?’ question, a serious rival to the Aristotelian account.
We can bring out its appeal with an analogy. Imagine that I care
about something because it is warm. And suppose that it is warm
because it is fire. While fire may be the ultimate feature that ex-
plains why it is warm, I do not care about it because it is fire, nor
is it clear that we should answer ‘what is warmth?’ as ‘being fiery’.
Being fiery explains warmth, and it is warm because it is fiery, but
that does not mean that fieriness is what warmth is. It is quite rea-
sonable to think that in asking ‘what is warmth?’ we want precisely
warmth, not something prior to it.
I have focused on how Socrates thinks of answers to the ‘what
is it?’ question in the Euthyphro. We should more closely consider
how he thinks of them across Plato’s works, including the other
Socratic dialogues, the discussion of forms as causes in the Phaedo,
the form of the good in the Republic, and the method of division in
Plato’s late dialogues.What sort of thing does Plato think an answer
to ‘what is f-ness?’ picks out andwhat sort of relations should it have
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to f-ness? Does Plato offer one consistent alternative to Aristotle or
does he develop different ideas in different works?
University of Wisconsin-Madison
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